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INTRODUCTION
The July 9, 2009 edition of a local South Florida paper, the Hometown
News, reported a story about Ellie DeStephan's ninety-second birthday cruise.'
After booking Ms. DeStephan's trip, her home health aide, Marilyn Angel,
realized that Ms. DeStephan would need a passport to board the ship.
Normally, applying for a passport is a simple task. But, in Ms. DeStephan's
case, "the passport agency wouldn't accept her birth certificate because it was
issued when she was 35 years old."' Realizing that the cruise line would accept
an original copy of the birth certificate in lieu of a passport, Ms. Angel
frantically tried to get the birth certificate back from the passport agency. She
couldn't get anyone to return her calls. Fortunately, the office of Ms.
DeStephan's U.S. representative came to the rescue. A caseworker reached
someone at the passport agency and ensured that the agency shipped back the
birth certificate in time. As a result, Ms. DeStephan enjoyed a ninety-second
birthday celebration aboard the Freedom of the Seas.
What's most remarkable about this story might be that it's not remarkable
at all. On a daily basis, representatives help constituents in a variety of ways. In
the case of Ms. DeStephan, a representative helped fulfill a birthday dream.
But often representatives help constituents address much more serious
problems, such as ensuring that a constituent receives a public benefits check
that staves off eviction.' Representatives understand the importance of
constituent service. So do political scientists, who have long recognized that
1. Jessica Tuggle, Passport Snafu Posed No Problem for Congressional Staff HOMETOWN NEWS,
July 9, 2009, http://www.myhometownnews.net/index.phpid= 59 5 9 4 .
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Ron Barber, U.S. Rep. Ron Barber's
Office Helps Constituent Collect $83,000 from Social Security (Feb. 5,
2013), http://barber.house.gov/press-release/us-rep-ron-barber%/E2%/80%/99s-office-helps
-constituent-collect-83000-social-security (describing Rep. Barber's successful efforts to
help constituents, including assisting an unemployed disabled veteran "threatened with
being evicted and having his power cut off' receive disability payments that had been
improperly withheld).
4. See, e.g., Nichole Kelley & David Haynes, An Interview with Senator Christopher D. Dingell,
77 MICH. B.J. 952, 952 (1998) (quoting State Senator Dingell as stating that
"[c]onstituent service is easily the best part of the job"); Terri Sewell, Sewell:
Constituent Service Involves Listening, and Then Doing Something to Help, ROLL CALL,
Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.rollcall.com/features/Freshman-CongressPolicy-Briefing/policy
briefings/-2n1471-1.html ("I have committed myself to focusing on areas where we
can make a difference. . . . In 2011, we helped constituents receive more than $1,375,000
in benefits owed to them by the federal government, and organizations in the district
were awarded more than $20 million in federal grants."); Statement by Senator Strom
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representatives develop a "home style" distinct from the partisan style they
employ within the legislature.' Yet constituent service has almost entirely
escaped the attention of one notable group -legal scholars and judges.
To be sure, constituent service has made occasional appearances in legal
scholarship, notably in discussions of term limits,' political corruption,' and
the proper role of legislators.' But it has never featured prominently. Perhaps
most surprisingly, election law scholars have largely ignored constituent service
despite working on topics with significant implications for the relationship
between representative and represented.' While some, most notably Heather
Thurmond, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic
/LeadersLectureSeries Thurmond.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) ("Certainly, it is our
job as legislators to make the law, but as public servants, it is our duty and responsibility to
come to the aid of the citizens of our states. . . . By simply helping someone resolve a
problem with their Social Security check or secure a passport, we can have a tangible and
positive impact in the lives of others.").
5. Richard F. Fenno popularized this phrase, which is commonly used in political science to
refer to representational activities that take place outside the legislature. See RICHARD F.
FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIRDISTRICTS (1978).
6. During the early 199os, legal scholars discussing the merits of term limits consistently
trotted out various arguments related to constituent service. Some argued that term limits
"reduce the incentives for legislators to be responsive to constituent concerns." Erik H.
Corwin, Recent Developments, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 569, 6o6 (1991). Others claimed that constituent service begets electoral
advantage, requiring the imposition of term limits. See, e.g., Joshua Levy, Note, Can They
Throw the Bums Out? The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits, So
GEo. L.J. 1913, 1916 (1992).
7. A number of scholars have suggested that constituent services, and particularly pork
barreling, involve delivery of public benefits to favored private parties or for campaign-
related purposes. See, e.g., James M. Falvey, The Congressional Ethics Dilemma: Constituent
Service or Conflict of Interest?, 28 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (1991); Theresa A. Gabaldon,
The Self-Regulation of Congressional Ethics: Substance and Structure, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 52
(1996); Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at the Local Level, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
715, 732-33 (2oo6); Mark W. Lawrence, Comment, Legislative Ethics: Improper Influence by a
Lawmaker on an Administrative Agency, 42 ME. L. REv. 423, 424-25 (1990).
8. Some scholars have suggested that time spent serving discrete constituent needs could
otherwise be spent addressing substantive policy matters. See, e.g., Joseph Cooper, Foreword:
Strengthening the Congress: An Organizational Analysis, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 321-22
(1975); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge ofFederal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1958-59 (2oo8).
9. In all of their many works on the law of the political process, Samuel Issacharoff, Richard
Pildes, and Pamela Karlan have used the terms of art "constituent service" or "constituency
service" rarely and in limited contexts: as a justification for districted elections and in a
description of Downsian public choice theory, Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 5o STAN. L. REV. 643, 678, 708
(1998) (noting that "[a] major advantage of districted elections is that they tie constituents
1409
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Gerken, have acknowledged the importance of constituent service,'o none have
rigorously incorporated constituent service considerations into election
law debates.n
This Note argues that election law scholars and judges dealing with
election law claims should take constituent service more seriously. Part I draws
on insights from the political science literature to describe constituent service
activities. These activities largely fall into three categories: representative-as-
ombudsman, accessibility, and appropriations. Part I then argues that all three
categories of constituent service activities are important, and often valuable,
components of the representation that constituents receive. Part II
demonstrates how these different aspects of constituent service might inform
two crucial areas of election law. Section II.A focuses on the constituent service
implications of the classic structuralist thesis that courts should prevent
mapmakers from designing legislative districts that undermine political
competition. Specifically, this Section proposes amending the structuralist
approach to permit some deviation from partisan equality within districts to
facilitate effective constituent service delivery. Section II.B focuses on the
constituent service implications of minority-majority districting, arguing that
Congress should require that jurisdictions impose no unnecessary or
unjustified structural barriers to effective constituent service delivery in
minority-majority districts.
and representatives together far more tightly than [proportional representation] systems
do" and that Anthony Downs "suggested that legislators defined utility as the delivery of a
bundle of constituent services that would maximize the likelihood of building a winning
coalition for the next election"); as part of broader arguments about the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering claims, Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the
Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 564 (2004); for the
idea that constituent service can help incumbents win over skeptical voters, Pamela S.
Karlan, Cousins' Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 521, 532 (1996); and
as part of an argument about the limited importance of territoriality in districting, Pamela S.
Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 83, 104; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a
Century, So VAND. L. REV. 291, 308 (1997) ("When it comes to policy, rather than territorially
allocated pork, the 'real' representatives of black southerners who live in majority-white
districts are Democrats from districts where a majority of the electorate supports those
policies.").
10. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1099, 1135 (2005)
("Whether one envisions constituent services as power or pork, individual election districts
sometimes allow representatives to distribute political goods independently of one
another.").
ii. Possible reasons for this glaring omission include justiciability concerns, difficulties
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1. CONSTITUENT SERVICE ACTIVITIES AND WHY THEY MATTER
The term "constituent service" involves a set of relationships between
individuals and their representatives that are often personal, idiosyncratic, and
hidden from public view." Before applying lessons of constituent service to
ongoing election law debates, it is therefore important to unpack the concept of
constituent service itself, both in order to identify its various elements and to
explore its contribution to the quality of representation that constituents
receive. It would be impossible, for instance, to argue convincingly that some
deprivation of constituent service constitutes a legally cognizable injury
without first identifying what constituent services are and then explaining why
the deprivation of those services might matter to a constituent or a court.
Recognizing that representatives play a multifaceted role in modern
democracies, political theorists have long understood that the concept of
representation includes non-policymaking functions. Hanna Pitkin, for
example, posited that political representation is a broad concept involving
"acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them."
For Pitkin, responsiveness -and, hence, representation- results from many
different types of interactions between representatives and constituents.'4
Building on this insight, Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps argue that
responsiveness in modern democratic systems can come from providing
services, allocating funds, and remaining accessible to constituents.s I refer to
such activities as "constituent service." Eulau and Karps do not necessarily
12. See, e.g., BRUCE CAIN, JOHN FEREJOHN & MORRIS FIoRINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE:
CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 36 (1987) ("Home style is in part a
unique, individualized response of members to their districts and the natural inclinations of
their personalities.").
13. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967). The classic
"delegates" and "trustees" model -in which representatives serve either as "delegates," who
simply vote their constituents' positions in the legislature, or as "trustees," who vote based
on their own personal views-is an exception insofar as it focuses exclusively on
policymaking within the legislature. See, e.g., Justin Fox & Kenneth W. Shotts, Delegates or
Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability, 71 J. POL. 1225, 1225 (2009) (arguing that
"whether the public evaluates the executive based on the policies she chooses or the
outcomes that her policies generate determines whether elections encourage her to behave as
a delegate or a trustee").
14. PITKIN, supra note 13, at 221-22.
15. Heinz Eulau & Paul D. Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of
Responsiveness, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q233, 247-48 (1977). Eulau and Karps outline three varieties
of responsiveness that, along with policy responsiveness, "capture the complexities of the
real world of politics": service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and symbolic
responsiveness. See id. at 241.
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argue that constituent service comprises an inherent component of
representation itself Rather, Eulau and Karps argue that as long as these non-
policymaking avenues for responsiveness remain open in our political system,
they contribute to the overall quality of representation that constituents
receive.
The political science literature reveals that most constituent service
activities fit into one or more of three broad categories: (1) "representative-as-
ombudsman," i.e., a representative's attempts to help constituents or groups
navigate government bureaucracies; (2) "accessibility," i.e., a representative's
efforts to keep in touch with constituents and, particularly, district
stakeholders; and (3) "appropriations," i.e., a representative's use of influence
within the legislative process to deliver discretionary funds back to district
interests." While these categories certainly fail to cover all constituent service
activities, they are meant to capture most of the ways in which legislators serve
their constituents. Each is subject to criticism but also capable of improving the
quality of representation that constituents receive.
A. Representative-as-Ombudsman
John R. Johannes describes the ombudsman role as being, "[i]n short, the
function of [the legislature] as intermediary between the government and the
governed-between citizens and the bureaucracy."17 He describes two primary
aspects of this role-casework and federal projects assistance." Casework,
which Johannes defines as "intervention for individuals, groups, or
organizations (including businesses) that have requests of, grievances against,
16. Some political scientists have engaged in extended observation of the constituent service
habits of individual representatives. Fenno, a practitioner of this approach, provides an
extensive discussion of such observation's pros and cons. FENNO, supra note 5, at 249-95.
Other political scientists have employed empirical methods. See, e.g., John C. McAdams &
John R. Johannes, Constituency Attentiveness in the House: 1977-1982, 47 J. POL. 1108, 1114-15
(1985) (attempting to determine factors that lead representatives to adopt various
constituent service strategies by examining various dependent variables); Glenn R. Parker &
Suzanne L. Parker, Correlates and Effects of Attention to District by U.S. House Members, 1o
LEGIs. STUD. Q.223, 224 (1985) (attempting to determine factors that lead representatives to
pay more attention to constituent concerns by using time spent in the district as the
dependent variable). Even Fenno engages in some data-driven analysis. See FENNO, supra
note 5, at 279-93. While most scholars have studied members of Congress, their general
insights might apply as strongly at the local level. In fact, Gerken has suggested that some
local officials exercise power primarily through constituent service delivery. See supra note lo
and accompanying text.
17. JOHN R. JOHANNES, To SERVE THE PEOPLE: CONGRESS AND CONSTITUENCY SERVICE 3 (1984).
18. Id. at 2.
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or a need for access to federal (and occasionally state or local) government
departments or agencies,"" might include, for instance, helping a constituent
demonstrate eligibility for social security benefits,2 o or nudging a local highway
department to fill a pothole. "Projects" assistance, which Johannes describes as
"assisting state and local governments in their attempts to secure federal grants
from agencies that possess discretion in allocating such funds,"" might
include, for instance, helping a local advocacy organization receive Department
of Housing and Urban Development funding." Fenno's observational studies
suggest that representatives spend some of their own time on ombudsman
tasks, but also frequently delegate such tasks to trained, full-time staffers.
While most legislative offices receive many casework and projects assistance
requests, the precise number varies between offices and between different
levels of government.
The ombudsman function improves quality of representation in several
ways. First, it helps constituents successfully navigate administrative
bureaucracies. Representatives and staffers develop expertise evaluating and
defending casework and projects assistance requests; agency staffers rely on
this expertise to reduce the amount of time they must spend interpreting and
responding to requests." Moreover, insofar as representatives control agency
ig. Id.
20. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Social Security, CONGRESSMAN GREGORY
W. MEEKS, http://meeks.house.gov/serving-you/help-social-security-case-work-issues (last
visited Oct. 30, 2013) ("My office assists many constituents with issues involving Social
Security eligibility and benefits.").
21. JOHANNES, supra note 17, at 2.
22. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Andr6 Carson, Congressman Carson Announces the
Damien Center and City of Indianapolis as Recipients of $1.4M Federal Grant (Mar. 30,
2012), http://carson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-carson-announces
-the-damien-center-and-city-of-indianapolis (describing Representative Carson's efforts to
secure such a grant for a non-profit organization in his district).
23. See FENNO, supra note 5, at 67-68 ("[Congressman A] has a small district staff-three
people, one full-time office, and one half-time office.... When he is touring around he is as
apt to hear someone's personal problems and jot them down on the back of an envelope as
he is to find out about these problems from his district aides.").
24. See John R. Johannes & John C. McAdams, Entrepreneur or Agent; Congressmen and the
Distribution of Casework, 1977-1978, 4 o W. POL. Q535, 539 (1987) (finding that the average
congressional office received 95.7 casework and projects assistance requests per week
between 1981 and 1983, that 85.3 of those requests involved casework and 10.3 involved
projects assistance, and that the average number of total per-week requests ranged from 13
to 354).
25. See generally R. ERIC PETERSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33209, CASEWORK IN A
CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE: BACKGROUND, RULES, LAWS, AND RESOURCES (2012),
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purse strings, agencies have incentives to take requests from representatives
seriously. 6 Second, and relatedly, the ombudsman function helps reduce
status inequalities between petitioners for agency services. The representative-
as-ombudsman not only distributes requests to the proper agencies and
bureaucrats, but also knows how to present those requests in convincing
ways." As a result, constituents with little relevant education or background
can, with the help of their representative, receive treatment comparable to what
the more educated and politically connected receive." Third, the ombudsman
function provides an important policy feedback mechanism for representatives
and for agencies. As Johannes notes, "casework is .. . a way not only of keeping
track of what executive agencies are doing but also of staying in touch with
people and their problems."" With accurate and timely information about the
effects of legislation on constituents, representatives are better able to reform
existing programs and to identify problems that might plague future
legislation.3 o Similarly, agencies rely on representatives and their casework
teams to provide informed feedback on agency service provision."
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33209.pdf (describing the laws, internal rules, and
regulations governing casework provision and outlining casework best practices).
26. JOHANNES, supra note 17, at 59 ("It is widely believed that by handling casework and other
congressional demands, agencies will ingratiate themselves with senators, representatives,
and their staffs.").
27. See CAIN, FEREJOHN & FIORINA, supra note 12, at 58 ("[Ciasework frequently provides an
opportunity for elected representatives to help constituents challenge the decisions of
bureaucrats.").
28. Unsurprisingly, political scientists have determined that the likelihood of making a
casework request generally decreases as education level increases, though the likelihood ticks
up again for the most educated. Johannes & McAdams, supra note 24, at 543-44; McAdams &
Johannes, supra note 16, at 1113.
29. JOHANNES, supra note 17, at 17 (describing the observations of several members of
Congress).
30. See id. at 165 ("[T]hese legislative efforts are remedial; they seldom deal with sweeping
changes or major innovations in public policy."); Larry P. Ortiz et al., Legislative Casework:
Where Policy and Practice Intersect, 31 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 49, 53 (2004) ("As a result of
constituents bringing problems they are having with federal agencies to their
congressperson's office, many programs have been amended." (citation omitted)).
31. See JOHANNES, supra note 17, at 61 ("If agencies process constituent and congressional
casework input effectively, one form of output is likely to be an improvement in agency
programs or operations due to correcting weaknesses turned up in congressional
complaints."). Several legal scholars have posited that this "oversight" function replaces the
proper form of legislative oversight: drafting legislation that defines the scope of agency
authority. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469, 491 (1985). In so doing, the legislature functions,
inappropriately, as a counter-executive. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the
1414
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B. Accessibility
A second category of constituent service activities involves a
representative's accessibility to constituents. "Accessibility" is of course a vague
term. The idea behind it is that representatives should make an effort to,
among other things, explain decisions, keep abreast of district interests, and
respond to individual constituent questions and concerns." Representatives
use various methods to remain accessible to their constituents. For instance, a
representative might hold town hall meetings and open office hours in the
district, attend events in the district, speak regularly with various district
stakeholders, publish online newsletters describing legislative activity, and
participate in live video chats with constituents." Additionally, representatives
might initiate efforts to resolve local problems, perhaps by hosting events that
bring together community stakeholders.14
Accessibility can provide various representational benefits for constituents.
First, legislators improve the quality of public debate when they take the time
to explain their views and activities and allow constituents to argue in favor of
alternative approaches.3 s Moreover, willingness to explain decisions helps
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem ofLegislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 340 (1990) (noting that Congress often attempts to
"influence agency action in the here and now, without passing statutes - acting, as has been
fashionable to accuse it recently, as a counter-executive"). But these criticisms assume that
Congress performs only a policymaking function and ignore the importance of the
"ombudsman" function. Moreover, some non-systemic problems are likely difficult to
resolve through the cumbersome legislative process.
32. FENNO, supra note 5, at 54 ("Politicians, like actors, speak to and act before audiences from
whom they must draw both support and legitimacy."); id. at 24o ("Although the
congressman can engage in [two-way] communication with only some of his supportive
constituents, he can give many more the assurance that two-way communication is
possible.").
33. See generally David Lazer et al., Online Town Hall Meetings: Exploring Democracy in the
21st Century, CONG. MGMT. FOUND. (2009), http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage
/documents/CMFPubs/online-town-hall-meetings.pdf (noting various ways in which
representatives keep in touch with constituents and arguing that online communication
tools have facilitated more frequent and efficient contact between representatives and their
constituents, thus developing increased constituent trust).
34. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
35. Not all interactions of this sort are productive, of course. For example, the health care town
halls of summer 2009 hardly exemplify quality political discourse. See, e.g., Paul Krugman,
The Town Hall Mob, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.con/2009/o8/o7
/opinion/07krugman.html (discussing unruly town halls "where angry protesters -some of
them, with no apparent sense of irony, shouting 'This is America!'-have been drowning
out, and in some cases threatening, members of Congress trying to talk about health
1415
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representatives develop constituent trust, which increases constituents'
satisfaction with their representation.36  Second, accessibility allows
representatives to remain aware of discrete district interests. Identifying and
balancing interests is no easy task; even minor demographic or economic
changes might demand that representatives reevaluate assumptions about the
districts they represent." Accessible representatives are likely better able to
maintain an accurate impression of constituent characteristics, preferences, and
intensities of preference, " and as a result to know when particular decisions
might be unacceptable to constituents." Third, representative-initiated efforts
can bring together community leaders and government figures to address
district problems.40
reform"). Yet many forms of dialogue between representatives and constituents can be
productive. Such interactions provide a rare opportunity for individuals to hold their
representatives to account and to express how particular pieces of legislation might affect
their personal interests.
36. See FENNO, supra note 5, at 56 ("[I]t takes an enormous amount of time to build and to
maintain constituent trust... . And that is why [House members] spend so much of their
working time at home."); Glenn R. Parker, The Role of Constituent Trust in Congressional
Elections, 53 PUB. OPINION Q 175, 193 & n.19 (1989) (noting that "[t]rust is primarily a
message that is most effectively conveyed when delivered in person," and finding that
"[a]bout 40% of those mentioning trust as something liked or disliked about their
congressman had either personally met the incumbent or attended a meeting or gathering
where the incumbent spoke").
37. See JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 31-32 (1973). Studies have
found that representatives vary significantly in their ability to accurately predict constituent
opinion on even highly salient issues. See Ronald D. Hedlund & H. Paul Friesema,
Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion, 34 J. POL. 730, 735-36 (1972) (explaining
this finding and arguing that "[r]epresentative democracy requires at least a fairly high level
of accurate information about constituency attitudes and opinions. Without that, legislative
institutions . . . do not provide a decision-making system that reflects the views and values
of the citizenry . . . ").
38. See John W. Kingdon, Politicians' Beliefs About Voters, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 137, 137-38
(1967). Similarly, Richard Fenno describes the efforts of Rep. Chaka Fattah, from
Philadelphia, to make himself accessible to "the policy-oriented groups with whom he
works." RIcHARD F. FENNO, GOING HOME 133-34 (2003) ("[M]ultiple, overlapping
neighborhood involvements give him a depth of constituency immersion that is remarkable
and - in my experience -unique.").
39. FENNO, supra note 5, at 151 ("On the vast majority of votes ... representatives can do as they
wish -provided only that they can, when they need to, explain their votes to the satisfaction
of interested constituents."); KINGDON, supra note 37, at 47 ("Congressmen sometimes find
themselves in the position of being unable to devise an acceptable explanation. In such a
situation, especially if they do not feel intensely about the matter, they often vote so as to
avoid the predicament.").
4o. For instance, Fenno lauds the efforts of Stephanie Tubbs Jones, a former representative
from Cleveland. FENNO, supra note 38, at 190-250. Because she was both a government
1416
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C. Appropriations
The appropriations category includes earmarks ("pork"), but also
includes other targeted government spending designed to serve particular
district interests. 42 The main advantage of the appropriations process for
constituent service is that it allows representatives to target state and federal
money to areas of significant local need that might otherwise remain unmet.
Staffers at administrative agencies, which largely control the distribution of
federal and state funds, are generally less aware of distinct district interests and
more likely to distribute money in accordance with national and statewide
policy goals.4 1 Providing representatives with some leeway to target small
amounts of money to discrete district interests ensures that district needs are
not perpetually ignored in favor of statewide and national interests.44
Importantly, despite the risk of earmark abuse, the system seems in many cases
official and a concerned member of the community, Rep. Tubbs Jones was able to bring
together various adults with professional or personal perspectives on youth violence for a
conference attended by 105 high school students. Id. at 214-16.
41. See, e.g., Rob Porter & Sam Walsh, Earmarks in the Federal Budget Process 4 (Harvard
Law Sch. Fed. Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing Paper No. 16, 20o6), http://www.law
.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/Earmarks_16.pdf (emphasizing that earmarks share four
characteristics: "specificity of the entity receiving funding, congressional origin, exemption
from normal competitive requirements for agency funding, and presence in statutory text").
42. Though congressional leaders implemented an unofficial federal earmark ban in early 2011,
the ban has no effect on state earmarks or other types of targeted federal appropriations and
in practice has hardly eliminated federal earmarks. See Jonathan Allen & Jessica Meyers, Don
Young's Railroad to Nowhere, POLITIco, July 10, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories
/0712/78 318.html; Molly K. Hooper, House GOP Sets Its Sights on Earmark Ban, THE
HILL, May 18, 2012, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/228245-republicans-taking-aim-at
-earmark-ban; Kimberly Kindy, Despite Earmark Ban, Lawmakers Try to Give Money to
Hundreds of Pet Projects, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/after-earmark-ban-lawmakers-try-to-direct-money-to-hundreds-of-pet-projects
/2011/11/29/gIQA2L2WAO story.html.
43. Members of Congress often emphasize this justification for earmarks when defending the
practice. See, e.g., Jon Tester, In Defense of Earmarks, INDEP. REc. (Helena, Mont.), Dec.
5, 2010, http://helenair.com/news/opinion/article_4974cddo-oo3a-leo-aa29-001cc4co3286
.html; Shira Toeplitz, Harry Reid Defends Earmarks in Omnibus, POLITICO, Dec. 16, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/12lo/465o5.html (quoting Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid).
44. See Brian Friel, Defending Pork, NAT'L J., May 8, 2004, http://www.nationaljournal.com
/member/magazine/transportation-defending-pork-200405o8. For instance, an Alaska
representative is likely to understand that, in Alaska, air travel often provides the only link
between communities. See 157 CONG. REC. S721-22 (daily ed. Feb. i, 2011) (statement of
Sen. Mark Begich) (discussing the importance of air travel for Alaskans); infra notes 54-55
and accompanying text (discussing Alaska's "Bridge to Nowhere").
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to serve constituent interests rather than nefarious "special interests" or the
whims of representatives. For example, the Department of Transportation,
which administers perhaps the most earmark-laden appropriations bill,
attempted to discredit earmarks by studying how many earmark-funded
projects would have received funding under the normal, merit-based system.4s
But "[a]fter finding that most of them would have qualified, the department
abandoned its probe."46
Although many legislation scholars have argued that the appropriations
process is nontransparent, wasteful, and inequitable, 47 these criticisms may be
overstated. First, recent reforms demonstrate that even the federal earmarking
process can operate with a reasonable degree of transparency. 8 Congress
passed various reforms between 2007 and 2009, which, combined with
changes in House and Senate rules, mandated that members of Congress
publicize earmark requests in order to provide other members and constituents
an opportunity to scrutinize them.49 As a result, in the words of one expert,
"[s]hafts of light . . . illuminate[d] these small but previously shadowed
pockets of discretionary spending. . . .'
As for wastefulness, it is certainly true that earmarking reduces the total
amount of money available for projects serving national and statewide policy
goals. But earmarking doesn't take up much of the total pie. According to a
45. Friel, supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 26-27 (1994)
(criticizing some earmarking as rent-seeking); James C. Otteson, A Constitutional Analysis of
Congressional Term Limits: Improving Representative Legislation Under the Constitution, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 15 (1991) (arguing that "pork-barreling" inequitably distributes federal
resources to districts with more senior representatives); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future
of the Item Veto, 83 IOwA L. REV. 79, 122 (1997) (arguing that pork barreling "fosters a
'redistributive disaster that no one would defend if they thought about it"' (quoting Steven
G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 34
(1995))).
48. See Richard Doyle, Real Reform or Change for Chumps: Earmark Policy Developments, 2oo6-
2010, 71PUB. ADMIN. REV. 34, 37-40 (2011).
49. Id. These reforms require the same level of transparency for conference reports and
committee recommendations. Id. at 37-39; see also Jason Heaser, Note, Pulled Pork: The
Three Part Attack on Non-Statutoryv Earmarks, 35 J. LEGIS. 32, 33 (2009) ("The modern trend
of earmarking legislation is moving away from earmarks within legislation and instead
placing the earmarks in conference reports and committee recommendations."). The House
and Senate Administration Committees have established other rules for earmarks,
including, for instance, requiring that representatives announce earmark requests on their
official websites. Doyle, supra note 48, at 39-40.
so. Doyle, supra note 48, at 42.
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study conducted prior to implementation of the federal earmarking "ban," total
spending on pork never exceeded $30 billion, and was often far less than that."
By comparison, in 2008, Congress authorized approximately $1.1 trillion in
total discretionary spending.s2 Moreover, even many of the projects generally
considered entirely wasteful benefit local residents." For instance, Alaska's
infamous "Bridge to Nowhere," though criticized in the national media,54 was
hardly as wasteful as depicted. Although most believed that the bridge's
exclusive purpose was to connect a sparsely populated island with the small
municipality of Ketchikan, in truth the project was meant to provide the first
non-ferry link between Ketchikan and its airport, a major transportation hub
for southeast Alaska." Even projects that appear to serve no existing
constituency interest might be designed to stimulate future demand."
Finally, the distribution of discretionary funds by representatives is not as
inequitable as some critics have claimed. District interest groups exert pressure
on all representatives to deliver earmarks. Representatives in turn have
incentives to support others' earmark requests in order to ensure that their own
51. See Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro & Emily 0. Wanless, Perception and Reality in
Congressional Earmarks, 7 FORUM: J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 1, 5 (2009) (noting that
earmarks made up one half of one percent of total FY 2008 federal outlays); see also Doyle,
supra note 48, at 41 (noting that after enactment of the 2007 reforms, total earmark spending
stabilized at approximately $20 billion a year).
52. Crespin, Finocchiaro & Wanless, supra note 51, at 4; see also id. at 5 (concluding that earmarks
made up one half of one percent of total FY 2008 federal outlays).
53. See id. at 3.
54. See, e.g., Ronald Utt, The Bridge to Nowhere: A National Embarrassment, HERITAGE FOUND.
(Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/1o/the-bridge-to-nowhere
-a-national-embarrassment.
55. See Alaska Editorial, Again, Yet? Back to Talk of the 'Bridge to Nowhere,' JUNEAU EMPIRE,
Mar. 1, 2012, http://juneauempire.com/opinion/2012-03-ol/alaska-editorial-again-yet#
.T5BChl6jLkB.
56. Those seeking state funding to build another Alaska "bridge to nowhere" emphasize that the
bridge will facilitate suburban development and pay for itself over time through toll
revenues. See Steven Mufson, Alaska "Bridge to Nowhere," the Knik Arm Crossing Project, Still
on the Table, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/alaska-bridge-to-nowhere-the-knik-arm-crossing-project-still-on-the-table/2011
/o8/o2/gIQApu7vwK story.html.
57. ROBERT M. STEIN & KENNETH N. BICKERS, PERPETUATING THE PORK BARREL: POLICY
SUBSYSTEMS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 30-32 (1995) (arguing that interest groups "can
serve as the eyes and ears of individual voters" and, as such, can pressure representatives to
distribute discretionary federal funds in ways that serve constituent preferences).
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requests also receive support.5' This process, sometimes skeptically referred to
as "logrolling," generally results in the delivery of some discretionary funds to
most districts,59  even though more discretionary funds go to districts
represented by senior, powerful representatives.o Relying on interest groups
to exert pressure is of course imperfect -such groups might merely amplify the
voices of already powerful local interests-but accessible representatives can
make their own determinations about constituent need. 6' Thus, through
earmarking, accessible representatives are able to contribute federal money to
important local projects that other political actors might have little ability or
incentive to fund.
In this Part, I have argued that ignoring constituent service means ignoring
avenues for responsiveness that can enhance the quality of representation that
constituents receive. The next Part, which incorporates constituent service
considerations into ongoing election law debates, relies heavily on these
insights.
s8. Political scientists generally call this model of the appropriations process-the idea that
representatives generally support each other's earmark requests in order to ensure that their
own earmarks also receive support- "universalism," though some political scientists attach
other labels, such as "blame avoidance," to variants of the same thesis. See, e.g., Steven J.
Balla et al., Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork, 46 AM. J.
POL. ScI. 515, 516-18 (2002).
sq. While empirical results cast some doubt on simplistic versions of universalism, see, e.g.,
Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, Congress, in Theory:
Subjecting Canonical Models of Distributive Politics to Basic (but Long Overdue) Empirical
Tests (2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/programs
/beyond/workshops/ampolpapers/springo8-howell.pdf (finding substantial variation in the
amount of discretionary funds returned to individual districts in each legislative session),
more nuanced models provide more robust empirical support, see STEIN & BICKERS, supra
note 57, at 135-36 (finding empirical support for a universalist model); Jeffrey Lazarus,
Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 338, 346-51 (2010) (finding that the distribution of
earmarks depends in part on "local demand-side factors").
6o. See, e.g., Frances E. Lee, Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition
Building and Distribution of Benefits, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 714, 726 (2003) ("Funds that were
allocated on an individual project basis were distributed in clearly 'political' fashion: House
members serving on the committee of jurisdiction secured more of these, as did members
advantaged by seniority or majority party status. Electorally vulnerable members - especially
those of the majority party-also received an added bonus."). But see DAVID R. MAYHEW,
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 146 (1974) (arguing that individuals who attain
positions of influence in Congress are often selected because they are "upholders of the
institution" who "engag[e] in institutionally protective activities that are beyond or even
against their own electoral interests").
61. See supra notes 37-39.
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II. THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUENT SERVICE ON ELECTION LAW
One of the most important recent debates in election law is over what role
courts should play in regulating the political process. Those advocating what is
often called the "individual-rights approach" believe that courts are ill-
equipped to identify and protect democratic values, and as a result support
limiting judicial intervention to cases where individuals or groups suffer
identifiable injuries. On the other side of the debate, so-called "structuralists"
favor a more active role for the judiciary, one that focuses more on policing
"the structures by which preferences are aggregated" rather than "the
treatment of individual voters.""
Neither side has paid much attention to constituent service. Judges
following the individual-rights approach have acknowledged that legally
cognizable injuries might arise if political rules degrade the quality of policy
responsiveness. 63 But, likely assuming that the Constitution has little to say
about constituent service activities, few courts have considered whether the
deprivation of constituent services might ever give rise to legally cognizable
injuries.* Similarly, structuralist scholars have almost entirely ignored the
constituent-service implications of their proposals.
In this Part, I first introduce constituent service considerations into the
debate over the classic structuralist claim that courts should police partisan
lockups. I then examine constituent service from the perspective of individual
rights and argue that current voting rights law ignores important constituent
service tradeoffs. To illustrate, I reexamine the districts challenged in League of
62. Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes ofMinimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its
Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1455 (2002); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional
Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1148-52 (2002) (suggesting that
responsiveness is itself a structural democratic value that courts should protect). Gerken
mentions "effective representation" -a concept that lends itself to no precise definition but
involves "the dynamics of the legislative process and representatives' day-to-day
relationship with their constituents" -as a potential structural mediating theory for the
Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" doctrines, but neither describes how courts might
regulate political structures to achieve "effective representation" nor argues that courts
should try. See Gerken, supra, at 1425. Courts in Canada do take questions of "effective
representation," including the representative's role as ombudsman, into account when
reviewing reapportionment. Robert W. Behrman, Equal or Effective Representation:
Redistricting Jurisprudence in Canada and the United States, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 277, 290-92
(2011).
63. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309-17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that political gerrymandering can impose legally cognizable
injuries).
64. But see infra notes 109-il and accompanying text.
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United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (L ULAC) 6 s and Shaw v. Reno66 in light
of the constituent service interests of minority constituents.
A. Constituent Service and Structuralists
Even though structuralist arguments depend on designing political
incentives to increase the likelihood that constituents receive optimal
representation, no one engaging in the debate over policing partisan lockups
has seriously considered constituent service tradeoffs. In this Section, I focus
on arguments presented by three of the most prominent participants in that
debate: Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff, authors of the most influential
structuralist argument for policing partisan lockups, and Nathaniel Persily,
who criticizes their approach. Unlike Persily, who maintains that seniority
provides representational benefits for constituents, I argue that seniority might
actually undermine the quality of representation that constituents receive. I
then argue that Pildes and Issacharoffs proposal to police partisan lockups
should be modified to account for constituent service considerations.
1. Contours of the Current Debate over Partisan Lockups
The standard partisan lockup - and the one I will focus on here - is a
partisan or bipartisan gerrymander, in which political parties succeed in
manipulating districts to minimize the likelihood of competitive elections."
Because these gerrymanders entrench incumbents, the aggregate outcome of
elections-the division of power in the legislature -fails to match the
distribution of political support within the electorate. Issacharoff and Pildes
propose that courts should police partisan lockups to ensure political
competition and electoral accountability.68 As Issacharoff explains, "the
electorate can only express a free and uncorrupted choice if it has the ability to
select among competing political prospects."" Underlying Issacharoff and
Pildes's argument is a commitment to the idea that courts should ensure a high
quality of political responsiveness. The thesis of their article Politics as Markets
makes this link explicit: "[W]e propose that a self-conscious judiciary should
65. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
66. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
67. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 9, at 651.
68. See id. at 646.
69. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593, 615 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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destabilize political lockups in order to protect the competitive vitality of the
electoral process and facilitate more responsive representation."7 o They use
similar language in other works:
The key to this approach is to view competition as critical to the ability
of voters to ensure the responsiveness of elected officials to the voters'
interests through the after-the-fact capacity to vote those officials out of
office. In turn, the accountability to the electorate emerges as the prime
guarantor of democratic legitimacy."
But like most structuralist election law scholars, Issacharoff and Pildes
evaluate responsiveness in terms of the overall partisan balance within the
legislature. Such an approach makes sense only from the perspective of policy
responsiveness; constituent service is largely unaffected by the distribution of
Democrats and Republicans." Rather than an oversight, this failure to consider
constituent service reflects a broader assumption that policy responsiveness
trumps all. As Issacharoff and Pildes acknowledge in Politics as Markets, "Only
through an appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the
central goals of democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the
political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens."
One prominent election law scholar, Nathaniel Persily, has criticized
Issacharoff and Pildes for ignoring the district-level representational effects of
their proposal. Persily claims that safe seats are "neither inherently undesirable
70. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 9, at 649.
71. Issacharoff, supra note 69, at 615; see also Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political
Competition, 85 VA. L. REv. 16o5, 1611 (1999) ("The way to sustain the constitutional values
of American democracy is often through the more indirect strategy of ensuring
appropriately competitive interorganizational conditions. It is in this way that central
democratic values, such as responsiveness of policy to citizen values and effective citizen
voice and participation, are best realized in mass democracies.").
72. See Balla et al., supra note 58, at 521, 523 (finding that earmarks are distributed largely evenly
among House members, but that members of the majority party tend to receive the most
valuable earmarks); Johannes & McAdams, supra note 24, at 547 (finding no connection
between political party and likelihood to focus on casework); cf James A. Gardner, What Is
"Fair" Partisan Representation, and How Can It Be Constitutionalized?: The Case for a Return to
Fixed Election Districts, go MARQ. L. REV. 555, 575 (2007) (" [U] sing partisanship as a vehicle
for representation may actually impede the satisfaction of local, territorially-defined interests
.... Because they are members of statewide political parties, representatives are no longer
responsive only to the voters in their districts, but are linked through party membership to
representatives of the same party from districts across the state.").
73. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 9, at 646.
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nor easily avoidable."' He notes that "the competitiveness maximization
strategy seeks to limit the opportunity for long-term relationships to form
between representatives and the represented."" He argues that these long-
term relationships facilitate better responsiveness because "[1]ong-term
representatives have a chance to learn about and understand the unique
problems of their districts and to pursue legislation that remedies those
problems," while "novice representatives are likely to be systematically inferior
to 'entrenched' representatives when it comes to the effective representation of
their constituents' views.",6
Persily's argument, though critical of Issacharoff and Pildes's, shares in
common with it a tendency to focus on the legislative process rather than on
representatives' "home styles." As we have already seen, political science
literature supports Persily's assertion that seniority allows representatives to
deliver a greater amount of money back to their districts through lawmaking
and appropriations." Yet Persily fails to justify his assumption that seniority
also contributes to a better understanding of distinct district interests. Nor
does he consider other aspects of constituent service delivery to determine
whether a senior representative's greater capacity to return political "goods" to
his constituents actually translates into a higher quality of constituent service
delivery - and a higher quality of representation more generally.
2. Seniority and Constituent Service
Taking those other aspects of constituent service into account, it becomes
clear that, contrary to Persily, partisan gerrymanders and safe seats likely
reduce the overall quality of constituent service delivery. This is true for at least
four reasons. First, even assuming that senior representatives are accessible
enough and motivated enough to deliver appropriations that constituents find
valuable, every extra discretionary dollar that senior representatives return to
their districts imposes a cost on constituents in districts without senior
representatives. Inequalities inherent in the appropriations process are perhaps
more defensible if individual constituents are advantaged at some times and
disadvantaged at other times. Insofar as partisan lockups result in certain
districts consistently having more senior representation, those particular
74. Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to
Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REv. 649, 650 (2002).
75. Id. at 671.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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districts will consistently receive a disproportionate percentage of total
discretionary funds. Policing partisan lockups would decrease the likelihood
that the same districts would receive a disproportionate share of appropriations
year after year.
Second, it is not at all clear that seniority actually leads to a greater
awareness of distinct district interests.71 In fact, political scientists have often
found that senior representatives, particularly from safe seats, are less accessible
to constituents,79 and thus less likely to remain aware of shifting district
interests. One explanation for this phenomenon is that senior representatives
prefer expending energy influencing and passing legislation on national issues
to addressing discrete district needs. Fenno quotes one long-time incumbent as
stating: "What's the use of having high seniority with the opportunity of being
influential in Congress if you have to spend all your time in your district?',so
He also describes a long-time incumbent who was less involved in "civic
engagement" and had a less "grassroots-oriented" frame of reference as
compared to a less-senior colleague; the more senior representative preferred to
address policy issues at a "broad level," mostly through legislative work in
Washington.8' By contrast, backbencher representatives -likely to be junior-
might find that they can make more positive change by working to address
district problems than by focusing on national issues. Furthermore, junior
representatives, who have yet to build up positive reputations for constituent
service provision, might have greater electoral incentives to contact
78. The assumption that it does pervades much election law scholarship. See, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 31
(2004) (noting that the Supreme Court's decision to endorse influence districts in the
Voting Rights Act context "ignores, for example, the importance of legislative seniority:
winning several elections in a row from the same district may be preferable to winning the
same number of seats spread among several districts").
79. Fenno observes that "the frequency of trips home is much greater for the low seniority
groups than it is for the high seniority group." FENNO, supra note 5, at 37. Other studies have
drawn similar conclusions. See, e.g., KINGDON, supra note 37, at 62 ("Independent of their
margins of victory, senior members of the House appear to be less preoccupied with their
constituencies than are junior congressmen. . . . [J]unior congressmen pay more careful
attention to constituency opinions. . . . These differences . . . persist while controlling for
other third variables."); GLENN R. PARKER, HOMEWARD BOUND: EXPLAINING CHANGES IN
CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 88-89 (1986) (noting that frequency of elections are a major
factor leading representatives to return to their districts and pay attention to discrete district
interests); Scott Ashworth, Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
441, 443 (2005) (finding that representatives spend a diminishing amount of time on
constituent service tasks as they become more senior).
8o. FENNO, supra note 5, at 188.
Si. FENNO, supra note 38, at 217-18.
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constituents and appear responsive."' Thus, while a senior safe district
incumbent might be more capable of exerting influence on behalf of discrete
district interests, it is less clear that the senior safe district incumbent would be
motivated to remain aware of shifting discrete interests and able to prioritize
them appropriately.
Third, political scientists have generally found that senior representatives
are less focused on casework.1 Casework is hardly a representative's or staffer's
favorite responsibility. While a powerful senior representative in a safe seat
might employ a district staff to handle casework concerns, that representative
is unlikely to play any personal role in casework or to invest significant
resources in casework.4 Fenno notes that in one instance a senior
representative from a majority poor, urban district consolidated his separate
urban and suburban district offices into one suburban office because it was in a
"[n]icer neighborhood" and his "staff like[d] it better," despite the fact that
many of his urban constituents lived far from the new district office and had no
easy way of accessing it.8 ' This lack of attention to casework is made more
problematic by the fact that senior representatives tend to receive more
casework requests than junior representatives, largely due to greater name
recognition and reputation lag.8 Although the larger number of requests
senior representatives receive might suggest that they are better positioned to
provide constituent services, the fact that they focus less overall attention on
82. See Jon R. Bond, Dimensions of District Attention over Time, 29 AM. J. POL. Sci. 330, 342, 344
(1985) (finding that unlike institutional leaders who hold positions of significant power
within Congress, junior representatives and representatives in less politically secure districts
have a large incentive to focus on discrete district interests in order to establish constituent
trust and build relationships).
83. See CAIN, FEREJOHN & FIORINA, supra note 12, at 95-96 ("[M]embers who were more
recently elected and those who represent marginal seats indeed have a greater casework
orientation."); John C. McAdams & John R. Johannes, Does Casework Matter? A Reply to
Professor Fiorina, 25 AM. J. POL. ScL 581, 586 (i 9 8) ("Senior congressmen, even those in
insecure electoral situations, solicit cases less, have fewer district staff persons doing
casework, and do a smaller proportion of their casework in the district. Younger, less
experienced congressmen behave just the opposite, even if they are electorally rather safe.").
But see Mark C. Ellickson & Donald E. Whistler, Explaining State Legislators' Casework and
Public Resource Allocations, 54 POL. RES. Q. 553, 563 (2001) (failing to find similar results at
the state legislative level).
84. See John R. Johannes, Explaining Congressional Casework Styles, 27 AM. J. POL. SC. 530, 538-39
(1983) ("House juniors, and especially freshmen, spend more time on casework than senior
members.").
85. FENNO, supra note 38, at 18o.
86. Johannes & McAdams, supra note 24, at 544-45.
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casework means that they actually spend significantly less time addressing each
casework request they receive.
Fourth, senior representatives might be most likely to provide constituent
services inequitably. Because senior representatives often rely on the same
coalition of supporters election after election, such representatives have an
incentive to target constituent service benefits to particular constituents at the
expense of others. Fenno argues that:
Constituency careers have two recognizable stages, expansionist and
protectionist. In the expansionist stage, the member of Congress is still
building a reliable reelection constituency....
During the protectionist stage of their constituency careers, House
members become less interested in building supportive constituencies
and most concerned about keeping the electoral support already
attained, about maintaining the existing primary-plus-reelection
constituencies. . . . Once the members are in the protectionist stage,
home activities are dominated by preventive maintenance.
Thus, once more-senior representatives enter the protectionist phase, they
likely target constituent services to members of their supportive constituencies
at the expense of other constituents. They might expedite casework requests
from supportive district stakeholders and become less accessible to non-
supportive stakeholders." And they might target discretionary funds to serve
the needs of supportive stakeholders, because of their greater awareness of the
distinct interests of supportive stakeholders and their desire to reward those
stakeholders.
87. FENNO, supra note 5, at 172-73.
88. See id. at 186-89 (noting that some senior representatives, even when facing competitive
elections, tend not to reach out to district interests outside of their supportive
constituencies); cf Robert P. Weber, Home Style and Committee Behavior: The Case ofRichard
Nolan, in HOME STYLE AND WASHINGTON WORK: STUDIES OF CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS 74
(Morris P. Fiorina & David W. Rohde eds., 1989) (noting that Rep. Richard Nolan, as he
entered the protectionist phase of his career, largely ignored constituencies with interests
opposed to those of his reelection constituency).
8g. See, e.g., Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, Donors Gave as Santorum Won Earmarks, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2os2/o/i6/us/politics/as-rick-santorum
-secured-earmarks-2006-donations-flowed-in.html (noting that while in the Senate, Rick
Santorum delivered earmarks desired by campaign contributors).
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3. Policing Lockups and Constituent Service
The constituent service arguments I outline, combined with the policy
responsiveness arguments offered by Issacharoff and Pildes, suggest that some
checks on entrenched incumbency are necessary to ensure optimal
representation. That said, while partisan lockups may hinder constituent
service delivery, courts should not indiscriminately break up partisan lockups
without considering whether doing so would degrade constituent service
quality. After all, as already noted, political competition of the sort Issacharoff
and Pildes seek is competition between political parties; constituent service
provision is largely exogenous to this type of political competition."
Issacharoff and Pildes might assume that removing partisan lockups would
allow candidates to compete on any number of issues, including constituent
service provision. On this theory, what matters most is that voters are able to
select the candidates they want without incumbents establishing self-serving
barriers to competition. However, it is almost certainly hard, if not impossible,
to predict a challenger's constituent service potential prior to an election. Many
"competitive" elections will likely feature candidates who would follow
identical constituent service strategies if elected. As a result, there is no reason
to think that partisan lockups systematically stymie voters who seek to oust
their representatives because of poor constituent service provision.9'
In fact, there are several reasons to suspect that Issacharoff and Pildes's
proposal might impose barriers to effective constituent service delivery. First,
and most importantly, since partisan competition bears no relationship to
quality of constituent service delivery, maximizing political competition might
force jurisdictions to design districts in ways that undermine constituent
service quality. After all, anytime a jurisdiction chooses to design districts with
one objective exclusively in mind, that jurisdiction might end up undermining
other valuable objectives.
Second, policing partisan lockups might keep constituents from being able
to use the ballot box to express accurate judgments about the quality of
constituent service they receive, decreasing representatives' incentives to
provide such services. Incumbents who have established positive reputations
go. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
91. Campaigns that focus on the quality of an incumbent's constituent service provision can and
do occur in primaries. See, e.g., David Welna, Republican Challenges Pile On in Ohio House
Race, NPR, Mar. 5, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2o12/o3/o5/147992o64/super-Tuesday-also
-hosts-congressional-primaries (describing a primary election in which the incumbent's
constituent service record came under fire).
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for constituent service provision reap electoral benefits." Indeed, positive
reputations for constituent service provision help explain why voters tend to
think more highly of their own representatives than of the institution of
Congress as a whole." But constituent service is generally a factor in elections
only after representatives have built up reputations for constituent service
provision.94 A representative is unlikely to develop such a reputation -positive
or negative-until many different voters and interest groups have interacted
with or attempted to interact with that representative. 95 Insofar as policing
lockups decreases the average length of a representative's career and increases
electoral instability, there is a risk that Issacharoff and Pildes's proposal would
reduce the electoral incentive that drives representatives to provide constituent
services in the first place. After all, representatives in competitive seats at the
outset of their careers are less likely to prioritize the long-term electoral gains
they might derive from constituent service provision given greater need for
short-term political advantage.
92. See Persily, supra note 74, at 670-71. Some see this advantage of incumbency as a structural
flaw: reputations for providing a high quality of constituent service allow incumbents to win
reelection even when voters might receive better policy responsiveness from someone else.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 623, 646, 673-74 (1996); Levy, supra note 6, at 1916. But if, as I argue,
constituent service is an important component of responsiveness, then the actual structural
flaw is that reputations often lag behind reality.
93. Cf Frank Newport, Congress'Job Approval Falls to 11% Amid Gov't Shutdown, GALLUP (Oct. 7,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165281/congress-job-approval-falls-amid-gov-shutdown
.aspx ("Americans now give their own representative a 44% approval rating, which is not an
extremely high rating on an absolute basis, but is certainly high compared with Congress'
overall 11% rating in the same survey.").
94. Legal scholars almost universally assume that focusing on constituent service provides an
electoral advantage to incumbents. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How
Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007);
Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1996). The claim is slightly more controversial among political
scientists, though most accept it. See, e.g., Gary King, Constituency Service and Incumbency
Advantage, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 119, 127-28 (1991); Douglas Rivers & Morris P. Fiorina,
Constituency Service, Reputation, and the Incumbency Advantage, in HOME STYLE AND
WASHINGTON WORK: STUDIES OF CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS, supra note 88, at 17, 20-22
("Constituents who expect their representatives to be helpful when contacted are much
more likely to rate the incumbent favorably and to vote for him."). But see John R. Johannes
& John C. McAdams, The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility,
or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512, 530-38 (1981)
(arguing that casework provision did not have a statistically significant relationship with
incumbent reelection in 1978).
gs. See Rivers & Fiorina, supra note 94, at 19-2o.
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Finally, even if entrenched incumbency is undesirable from a constituent
service perspective, so is constant turnover. Representation has a learning
curve. Persily is doubtless right that representatives need to serve for some
length of time before they understand how best to deal with casework requests,
prioritize distinct district interests, and engage in legislative bargaining for
desired earmarks. It is doubtful that implementing Issacharoff and Pildes's
proposal would lead to an optimal average length for congressional careers
from a constituent service perspective.6
4. A Possible Solution
To avoid undermining constituent service delivery, Issacharoff and Pildes's
proposal should be adjusted to recognize a constituent service affirmative
defense to a partisan lockup challenge.9 7 This defense would be objective in the
sense that it would inquire into the structural incentives for a hypothetical
representative to deliver constituent services, not into the actual or likely
constituent service delivery patterns of any existing or presumed
representative. Such a defense could be articulated in terms of either intent or
effect. On the intent side, courts might uphold a challenged map if a defendant
jurisdiction could provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
mapmakers' primary motivation for deviating from partisan balance was
maximizing the quality of constituent service delivery. 8 Since an intent-based
affirmative defense would justify deviation from partisan neutrality only when
96. Putting aside all other considerations, including the quality of legislative output, legislative
term limits would seem the most direct way of resolving problems related to entrenched
incumbency. But see Corwin, supra note 6, at 601-02, 605-o6 (noting that lame ducks are
particularly likely to ignore constituent interests).
97. Just like the Issacharoff and Pildes proposal itself, this discussion is largely theoretical. The
Supreme Court has yet to articulate a test to evaluate the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymanders. In fact, a plurality of the Court has suggested that no workable standard
exists, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004), though Justice Kennedy, while
agreeing that no workable standard exists at this time, has refused to foreclose the
possibility that a workable standard might emerge in the future. Id. at 309-10 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Thus, this proposal rests on the assumption that, contrary to
current doctrine, courts have embraced the Issacharoff and Pildes "partisan lockups"
approach. In other words, this proposal assumes that courts have taken on responsibility for
examining whether districts, as designed, promote partisan competition, and have decided
to dismantle district maps that advantage one party over the other.
g8. This approach would be consistent with Justice Stevens's preferred approach to adjudicating
partisan gerrymandering claims. See id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n evaluating a
challenge to a specific district, I would . . . ask whether the legislature allowed partisan
considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.").
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constituent service delivery was a primary motivation for drawing challenged
district lines, it could not justify a true partisan gerrymander.
The problem, though, is that determining true intent is difficult. While
courts evaluating racial gerrymandering claims have looked to mapmakers'
"predominant intent" in designing individual districts," a plurality of the
Supreme Court has expressed well-placed skepticism about the ability of
judges to identify predominant motivations outside the racial gerrymandering
context. 0o As the Court put it:
Determining whether the shape of a particular district is so
substantially affected by the presence of a rare and constitutionally
suspect motive as to invalidate it is quite different from determining
whether it is so substantially affected by the excess of an ordinary and
lawful motive as to invalidate it. 01
Here, the intent test would examine whether the "shape of a particular district
is so substantially affected by the presence of... an ordinary and lawful motive
as to" validate it."o' But that seems a distinction without a difference. Courts
would still have to engage in the difficult process of determining whether one
particular motive- maintaining constituent service quality - sufficiently
predominated over other permissible considerations -such as respecting
natural geographic boundaries - that might not justify deviation from partisan
equality.
Advocates of an intent test might respond that courts could look to the
evidentiary record mapmakers compiled to support the maps they drew. But
mapmakers might use constituent service as a pretext, hiding true partisan
motivations by discussing decisions exclusively in terms of constituent service
quality. Indeed, in a world where courts police partisan lockups, political
parties would likely take any opportunity to slip favorable maps through the
cracks. Parties thus might invest significant resources in developing rich
evidentiary records to support the notion that, contrary to reality, the
mapmakers' primary motivation was constituent service quality.
Because of the difficulties inherent in identifying the mapmakers'
"predominant motivation" - and because what matters ultimately is the quality
of representation that constituents receive, not the mapmakers' intent-I
99. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284-85 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), and Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
1o. Id. at 285-86.
101. Id. at 286.
102. See id.
1431
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
suggest that courts instead apply an effects test. Under such a test, courts
might allow defendant jurisdictions to justify challenged maps on the ground
that those maps have positive effects on constituent service delivery compared
to partisan-neutral baselines. The defendant jurisdiction would have the
burden of showing that the proposed map would provide specific constituent
service benefits that could not be replicated under a partisan-neutral map.
Since entrenched incumbency often comes to undermine constituent
service delivery, courts should not allow an effects-based constituent service
affirmative defense to justify long-lasting incumbent protection schemes.
Thus, courts should require defendant jurisdictions to demonstrate
increasingly significant constituent service benefits as deviation from partisan
neutrality increases. For example, to justify small but hardly insubstantial
deviation from a partisan-neutral baseline, a jurisdiction might have to show
that adoption of a partisan-neutral map would impose significant constituent
service costs. Small but hardly insubstantial deviation might describe a district
that on average supports the Republican presidential nominee by a 55/45
margin but, depending on the local and national political climate and the
specific candidates, has a realistic chance of electing a Democrat to Congress in
any given election.o 3 By contrast, justifying large deviation-say, a 70/30
Democratic district -would require showing that any possible partisan-neutral
map would deprive a certain large group of constituents of virtually all
constituent services, leaving them unrepresented as far as constituent service is
concerned. Such a showing would likely prove impossible in all but the most
extreme cases.
Of course, this test would require judges to engage in some intensive fact
finding and critical evaluation of proffered justifications. To prevent use of
constituent service as an excuse for partisan entrenchment, courts might
require jurisdictions to prove constituent service benefits by clear and
convincing evidence rather than by just a preponderance. To make the required
showing, jurisdictions might rely on various types of evidence. For example,
they might present expert testimony from political scientists discussing
structural disincentives to constituent service delivery and the advantages of
103. For instance, many congressional districts gerrymandered after the 2000 Census to favor
Republicans elected Democrats to Congress in 20o6. See, e.g., Richard E. Cohen, GOP Plays
It Safe on Redistricting, POLITICO, Mar. 16, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories
/o311/51370.html. Many of those same districts reverted to form in 201o and elected
Republicans, again as a result of the national political climate. Id. The possibility that a
national wave might overcome a slight partisan lean motivated Republicans, after the 2010
census, to focus on protecting incumbents rather than "pushing GOP-controlled state
legislatures to turn the screws on incumbent Democrats." Id. As Rep. Lynn Westmoreland
put it, "Pigs get fat. Hogs get slaughtered." Id.
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the challenged map in overcoming those disincentives."o4 Or they might
present expert evidence from political scientists, demographers, or economists
explaining that no partisan-neutral map could avoid diluting representation of
a particular group of residents who share a common racial, socio-economic, or
geographic profile.'o Plaintiffs, of course, could then present their own
evidence rebutting the defendant jurisdiction's showing. They might try to
demonstrate, for instance, that a plausible partisan-neutral alternative exists, or
that the asserted constituent service benefits are illusory, or that the
jurisdiction's preferred map imposes countervailing constituent service costs.
Some might argue that fact-intensive review of the political process is
inconsistent with the judicial role.o' But courts evaluating claims brought
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act are already forced to resolve
complicated factual disputes regarding the representational effects of district
maps.o7 And Part I suggests some possible judicially manageable standards for
determining constituent service quality. Courts could look to whether and to
what extent the challenged map: (1) aids representatives in performing their
ombudsman function; (2) helps representatives remain accessible to
constituents; and/or (3) facilitates effective delivery of appropriations to
district interests.
Others might worry that an effects test would simply facilitate a war of
experts, who might lack access to reliable evidence demonstrating how a
challenged map would improve or degrade constituent service quality. But Part
I illustrates that political scientists can employ traditional methodologies to
evaluate the constituent service implications of challenged district maps.os And
it might not be all that bad if many cases devolve into unresolvable battles
between experts. Under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, courts in
such circumstances would simply reject the constituent service affirmative
defense and dismantle the partisan lockup. Given the representational harms -
including constituent service harms -that result from entrenched partisan
104. This evidence might be particularly appropriate in a case where, for instance, the defendant
jurisdiction argues any partisan-neutral map would require drawing at least one long and
skinny district in which constituent service delivery might prove difficult. I discuss such
disincentives in detail in Subsection II.B.2.
105. This evidence might be particularly appropriate in a case where, for instance, any partisan-
neutral map would result in splitting an agricultural part of the state into districts
dominated by urban interests. I discuss such dilution in detail in Subsection II.B.i.
1a6. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 (expressing skepticism about the justiciability of an effects test in
the partisan gerrymandering context).
107. See infra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
mo8. See supra note 16.
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lockups, the constituent service affirmative defense should perhaps only apply
when a challenged map clearly and convincingly enhances constituent service
quality.
B. Constituent Service and Individual Rights
Constituent service provision should also matter for scholars and judges
who prefer to think about election law issues in terms of individual rights. In
fact, some judges have already acknowledged as much. All courts to have
considered the issue have held that jurisdictions may, consistent with the "one
person, one vote" principle, design districts with equal total populations, rather
than equal numbers of eligible voters, in order to ensure that each resident has
an equal ability to petition for services."09 The Ninth Circuit has even
suggested-albeit in dictum-that the Equal Protection Clause requires
jurisdictions with large numbers of non-citizens to design districts with equal
total populations to guarantee what Judge Alex Kozinski, in dissent, termed
"equality of representation.""o But this technical issue rarely arises."'
In this Section, I will examine an issue with potentially broader
implications: race and reapportionment. I limit my analysis to minority-
majority districts because I want to avoid overstating my case. Inadvertent
structural disincentives for constituent service provision cannot always be
legally actionable. Whenever districts are redesigned during reapportionment,
some residents will, for whatever reason, end up receiving a lower quality of
representation, but this fact alone cannot be enough to support a legal
log. See Chen v. City of Houston, 2o6 F. 3 d 502, 528 (Sth Cir. 2000) (deferring to the mapmakers
in the absence of clear constitutional standards for choice of measurement); Lepak v. City of
Irving, 453 F. App'x 522, 523 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (reaffirming Chen and holding that
total population is a permissible baseline); Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996)
(same); Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 775 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Non-citizens are
entitled to various federal and local benefits, such as emergency medical care and pregnancy-
related care provided by Los Angeles County. As such, they have a right to petition their
government for services and to influence how their tax dollars are spent." (citation
omitted)); Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 481 P.2d 489, 494 (Cal. 1971) ("[M]uch of a
legislator's time is devoted to providing services and information to his constituents, both
voters and nonvoters. A district which, although large in population, has a low percentage of
registered voters would, under a voter-based apportionment, have fewer representatives to
provide such assistance and to listen to concerned citizens.").
no. Garza, 918 F.2d at 775; see also id. at 782 (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
ms. See supra note 109. In fact, the Supreme Court apparently assumed that principles of equal
voters and equal representation would never conflict. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526, 531 (1969) ("Equal representation for equal numbers of people is a principle designed to
prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to elected representatives.").
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challenge."' The minority-majority district context is distinct, however,
because Congress and the courts have consistently emphasized the importance
of protecting the representational interests of minorities."' In this Section, I
first articulate a new proposal for protecting the constituent service interests of
minorities. I then reexamine two recent Supreme Court cases to see what
difference my proposal might have made if it had been in effect at the time they
were decided. My discussion of these cases illustrates how my proposal might
operate in practice and underscores the importance of constituent service
considerations in the minority voting rights context.
1. A New Proposal for Protecting Minority Representational Rights
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is perhaps the best example of America's
commitment to protecting minority representational rights."' But,
notwithstanding its importance, the Voting Rights Act falls prey to the same
problem plaguing the rest of the election law field: a failure to adequately
consider aspects of representation other than policy responsiveness. Section 2,
for instance, precludes a state or political subdivision from implementing any
11. For instance, some urban voters will inevitably be placed in majority rural districts, and vice
versa. The fact that a representative from the rural part of a district might provide a higher
quality of constituent service to rural residents -perhaps because the representative is more
familiar with the concerns of rural residents, or because rural residents comprise the
representative's reelection constituency -does not mean that urban residents have suffered
legally cognizable injuries.
113. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) ("The essence of a [Voting Rights
Act] § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and
historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives."); see also Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The
Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1448 (1991) ("[S]econd-generation
litigation is premised on the assumption that, by increasing the number of black
representatives, single-member district voting will ensure that blacks have effective
representation."). Even Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), acknowledges the
continuing need to protect minority voting rights. See id. at 2631 ("Our country has
changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure
that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.").
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1973-1973aa-6 (20o6). The Senate Report accompanying passage of the 1982
amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act reiterates the broad remedial purpose of
the Act - "the question whether the political processes are 'equally open' depends upon a
searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,"' S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30
(1982) (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766, 770 (1973)), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208-and notes that one factor that may "have ... probative value as part
of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation [is] whether there is a significant lack of
responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of
the minority group," id. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207.
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"voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure" if its implementation would provide members of a minority group
with "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.""' Yet once
minority voters have been provided the right to cast undiluted votes and elect
representatives of their choice, section 2 stops guaranteeing minority
representational rights. No part of the Voting Rights Act looks beyond the
legislature to the quality of constituent services that representatives, once
elected, actually provide, or to the second-order structural effects of minority-
majority districting requirements on constituent service delivery.n 6
This failure seems inconsistent with the Voting Rights Act's broad
remedial purpose of ensuring that minorities receive fair and equal
representation. For one thing, insofar as constituent service facilitates a high
quality of representation, voting rights law should prevent the political process
from unfairly degrading the quality of constituent services that minority
constituents receive. Moreover, since virtual representation- the concept that
individuals can be "represented" by any representative who shares their traits
or views regardless of what district that representative officially serves - is
generally unavailable in the constituent service context,1 7 minority constituents
might have a particular interest in electing candidates who will provide them a
high quality of constituent services. Thus, expanding the voting rights arsenal
to take constituent service interests into account would further promote
political and representational equality.
At the broadest level, Congress could authorize minority constituents to
bring voting rights claims based on a deprivation of equal access to constituent
services. Under this approach, minority plaintiffs could challenge district maps
on the ground that they dilute the quality of constituent services that
minorities receive. While this broad approach has some merit, it also poses
challenges, including the potential need for courts to weigh competing
representational interests - such as policy responsiveness and constituent
service-against each other. As a result, I will focus on a more modest
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b).
116. Even prior to invalidation of the coverage formula for section 5 preclearance, see Shelby Cnty.,
133 S. Ct. 2612, a jurisdiction could hardly have been accused of retrogression merely because
minority residents were likely to have received a lower quality of constituent services on the
new map compared to the old.
117. Representatives rarely -if ever -provide constituent services to residents of other districts.
See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1589, 1609-11 (1993) (noting that for this reason, virtual
representation does not apply to constituent service).
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alternative. My proposal would come into play when a jurisdiction has some
preexisting legal obligation to draw a minority-majority district and must
select between several different potential minority-majority districts to satisfy
that obligation. In such circumstances, the jurisdiction should not be allowed
to select a district in which, all else equal, minority constituents would receive a
lower quality of constituent services than minority constituents would have
received had the jurisdiction selected a different district."' Thus, my proposal
treats constituent service as a factor only when jurisdictions can select among
various potential districts, any of which would satisfy all other Voting Rights
Act obligations.
My purpose here is to explain in a general way why such a reform is
needed, not to resolve all the procedural and legal problems that might plague
implementation. Nevertheless, it is worth fleshing out a few specifics. First, I
offer this proposal as a modification to available statutory remedies for Voting
Rights Act violations, rather than as an interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause."' Congress could conceivably enact such a reform pursuant to its
powers to implement the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the same
powers Congress relied on when it originally enacted sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. 2 o
118. Because my proposal applies regardless of the statutory basis for the requirement that a
jurisdiction draw a minority-majority district, and section 2 remains a valid basis for such a
requirement, Shelby County does not render my proposal moot. Moreover, the Department
of Justice has indicated a willingness to use section 3's bail-in provision to maintain a
preclearance requirement for certain jurisdictions. See Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage,
U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.coM/201 3/o7/26/us/holder-wants-texas-to-clear-voting-changes-with
-the-us.html. Finally, Congress might pass a new coverage formula, making the demise of
section 5 only temporary.
ng. It might be possible to implement my proposal, along with the broader version elaborated
in the previous paragraph, under the Equal Protection Clause, but the legal issues would be
complicated. For one thing, were plaintiffs to bring such claims directly under the Equal
Protection Clause, they would likely have to show discriminatory intent. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1976). For another, courts might prove ill-equipped to
determine proper equal protection standards in this context, given that reapportionment
necessarily involves a complicated balance of various representational interests. Congress, by
contrast, can develop appropriate standards through the legislative process. See supra notes
113-115 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("It is well established
that Congress' judgment regarding exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial deference. The [Voting Rights Act] addresses
the combination of race discrimination and the right to vote, which is 'preservative of all
rights."').
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Second, insofar as procedure is concerned, a plaintiff would start with the
burdens of production and persuasion. The plaintiff initially would have to
make out a prima facie case demonstrating, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the jurisdiction selected a minority-majority district featuring
structural barriers to constituent service delivery not present in an alternative
district the jurisdiction could feasibly have selected. This prima facie case
would likely turn on the same types of expert evidence that jurisdictions would
present to support a constituent service affirmative defense to a partisan lockup
claim. 21
The jurisdiction could try to rebut the prima facie case by challenging the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence or the significance of the asserted
structural barriers to constituent service delivery, or by arguing that the
plaintiffs preferred district imposes its own structural barriers to constituent
service delivery that are at least as serious as those imposed by the proposed
district. However, if the plaintiff were to succeed in proving a prima facie case
by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden would shift to the jurisdiction
to justify its district choice according to neutral principles. Such neutral
principles might include, for instance, maintaining the compactness and
contiguity of a district, or respecting existing municipal boundary lines.m'
Since the purpose of minority-majority districting is to facilitate effective
representation for minority constituents, courts and Congress should not allow
pursuit of partisan advantage to constitute a neutral principle. If the
jurisdiction shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it has some valid
neutral justification for its decision, courts should defer to the jurisdiction.
It is worth noting that the prima facie case looks only to effects, while the
neutral principles inquiry looks to both intent and effects."' Under the neutral
principles requirement, the jurisdiction must be able to show that it has
selected certain district lines in order to serve some legally permissible purpose
(intent) and that the district lines in fact serve that purpose (effect). This
hybrid test addresses a major problem facing courts in the racial
reapportionment context: isolating only those district maps that impermissibly
discriminate. After all, the constituent service interests of minority residents are
just one category of representational interests mapmakers must take into
121. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
122. Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-81 (1964) (discussing various neutral principles that
might justify deviation from one person, one vote).
123. This combined "intent and effect" test is hardly unprecedented in election law. See Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (requiring plaintiffs asserting a partisan
gerrymandering claim "to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group").
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account when drawing districts. By looking both to intent and effect, the
neutral principles inquiry avoids invalidating maps that are designed to serve
and actually do serve valid representational interests. For instance, mapmakers
might select a certain minority-majority district, knowing full well that
minority residents would receive a higher quality of constituent service delivery
in an alternative district, because mapmakers wanted to prevent splitting a
municipality into multiple districts. While it is certainly possible to argue that
constituent service should predominate over at least some other permissible
districting considerations, my intent and effects test leaves those tradeoffs to
the political process.
To illustrate how minority-majority districting schemes might implicate
constituent service delivery and to explore how my proposal might better
protect constituent service interests, I examine the factual backgrounds of two
well-known election law cases: League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
(LULAC)'" and Shaw v. Reno.'" LULAC and Shaw feature different structural
barriers to constituent service delivery: lack of cultural compactness in LULAC
and bizarre district shape in Shaw.
2. LULAC and Cultural Compactness
LULAC arose out of Texas's 2003 mid-decade congressional redistricting.
Compelled by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to maintain a certain number
of minority-majority districts, Texas replaced a district in which minorities
shared common interests, District 23, with one that "combine[d] two farflung
segments of a racial group with disparate interests," District 25.126 The
plaintiffs brought a section 2 claim challenging the state's decision to dismantle
District 23 in favor of District 25. The Court, per Justice Kennedy, agreed with
the plaintiffs."' As Pildes explained:
124- 548 U.S. 399 (20o6).
125- 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
126. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 433; see also id. at 424 ("The Latino communities at the opposite ends of
District 25 have divergent needs and interests, owing to differences in socio-economic status,
education, employment, health, and other characteristics." (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Because I discuss generally the constituent service implications of the
state's choice of one district over another, the basis for the requirement that the state draw a
minority-majority district in the first place is immaterial. Thus, the modifications to the
minority-majority districting requirements of the Voting Rights Act that result from Shelby
County fail to diminish the relevance of this example.
127. Id. at 441-42.
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[District 25] joined together poor rural Hispanics along the Texas
border with the far more well-off Hispanics living in the urban, state
capitol area of Austin. . . . [F]or Justice Kennedy, the Austin and Rio
Grande Hispanic communities lived in worlds far apart, not just
physically, but culturally, economically, educationally, and in other
ways-differences that were decisive.128
In other words, District 25 was insufficiently "culturally compact."129  In
LULAC, the Supreme Court for the first time held that the selection of one
minority-majority district instead of another could impermissibly dilute
minority voting power."o Given traditional vote dilution jurisprudence, which
has tended to focus on the number of minority-majority districts rather than
the choice of minority-majority district, LULAC's reliance on "disparate
interests" seems misplaced. As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in dissent in
LULAC, the number of Latino-majority districts in Texas remained the same
after implementation of court-mandated changes to the district map."
128. Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1139, 1144 (2007).
129. Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48, 5o (20o6).
130. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 429 ("The Court has rejected the premise that a State can always
make up for the less-than-equal opportunity of some individuals by providing greater
opportunity to others. As set out below, these conflicting concerns are resolved by allowing
the State to use one majority-minority district to compensate for the absence of another only
when the racial group in each area had a § 2 right and both could not be accommodated."
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
131. See id. at 497 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Here the District Court found that six Latino-
majority districts were all that south and west Texas could support. Plan 1374C provides six
such districts, just as its predecessor did. This fact, combined with our precedent making
clear that § 2 plaintiffs must show an alternative with better prospects for minority success,
should have resulted in affirmance of the District Court decision on vote dilution in south
and west Texas."). Several election law scholars have attempted to justify the LULAC
decision based on conventional legal principles. Pildes argues that Justice Kennedy's concern
in LULAC was with what the Justice perceived to be "racial essentialism" in the design of
District 25, thus violating the legal principle of dignity. See Pildes, supra note 128, at 1144.
Treating voters as members of racial groups rather than as individuals might somehow
impinge on dignity, but Pildes fails to adequately explain why the state in LULAC
committed such a serious violation of human dignity as to make its map legally
impermissible given that the state had to draw a minority-majority district one way or the
other. Guy-Uriel Charles posits that LULAC might represent the vindication of
"representational rights." Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting and Representation, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1197 (2007). Charles argues that, for Justice Kennedy in LULAC,
incumbency advantage constituted an impermissible justification for burdening the
minority voters of District 23, who had been mobilizing to defeat their incumbent
representative. Id. at 1201-02. His argument, however, fails to explain why politically
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Under my proposal, the Court would have reached the same result-
invalidation of District 25 in favor of District 23-but for different reasons.
Instead of straining conventional Voting Rights Act principles, the Court
would have rested its decision on a more concrete representational injury:
districts lacking cultural compactness likely foster less effective constituent
service delivery when compared with culturally compact alternatives. This is
for several reasons. First, a representative from District 25 would have less
reason to focus on the particularized interests of minority constituents because
those interests would be diffuse rather than discrete. Representatives are more
likely to make themselves accessible to district stakeholders and advance
district interests when those interests are shared - and prioritized - by large
numbers of constituents."' As the number of distinct interests in a district
increases-and particularly when those distinct interests conflict-the
advantages that a representative derives from remaining accessible and
responsive to discrete district interests decline, as do the disadvantages of
ignoring those interests."' Even if a representative from a heterogeneous
district were to make herself accessible to all constituents despite the
diminished value of each hour spent in the district, that representative would
likely have a difficult time identifying which interests she should prioritize.'34
In addition, remaining accessible to all district interests in a heterogeneous
district would potentially take so much time that other responsibilities -such
as policymaking - might suffer.
Second, constituents in districts such as District 25 receive fewer benefits
from the delivery of discretionary funds. For one thing, insofar as accessibility
facilitates more effective earmarking, the quality of earmarking would suffer as
organized groups retain rights against the state. The state has not deprived these individuals
of their right to vote or organize; the state has merely changed district boundaries such that
a majority of constituents in the newly constituted district oppose the preferences of the
organized group. Reapportionment frequently reorganizes groups of voters and upsets
settled voting patterns.
132. See CAIN, FEREJOHN & FIORINA, supra note 12, at 19 ("A representative elected with the votes,
efforts, and resources of the people of a specific geographic area naturally attaches special
importance to their views and requests . . . ."); Thomas E. Cavanagh, The Calculus of
Representation: A Congressional Perspective, 35 W. POL. Q120, 125-26 (1982) (suggesting that
representatives are more likely to take district preferences seriously when a "district-wide
consensus" exists); cf Gardner, supra note 72, at 577-80 (noting that designing districts that
split up political communities undermines the representation of discrete district interests).
133. See KINGDON, supra note 37, at 36-37 (noting that representatives are highly likely to take
action when they "see the whole economy of their area at stake [because] when the economy
is at stake, jobs are on the line").
134. See Donald J. McCrone & Walter J. Stone, The Structure of Constituency Representation: On
Theory and Method, 48 J. POL. 956, 971-73 (1986).
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a result of reduced accessibility. 13  For another, since constituents in
heterogeneous districts share fewer priorities, each dollar brought back to such
a district likely benefits fewer residents than if it had been brought back to a
homogeneous district. Since outcomes of the appropriations process reflect in
part the degree of constituent need, representatives from heterogeneous
districts are likely at a disadvantage in the legislative negotiating process.136
Moreover, the diminished per-constituent value of projects in heterogeneous
districts reduces representatives' electoral incentive to raise funds for and
personally contribute time to such projects. Thus, fewer dollars would likely
have returned to District 25, and the projects funded in District 25 would likely
have done less good for constituents.
Third, representatives in homogenous districts usually have an easier time
fulfilling their ombudsman function. The types of requests constituents make
differ depending on socioeconomic status. Lower-income constituents might
seek assistance navigating government benefits bureaucracies while wealthier
constituents might seek assistance navigating the licensing rules for small
businesses. In a district split between rich and poor constituents, casework
staffers would be less able to develop expertise dealing with a single category of
requests. In addition, heterogeneous districts require representatives to
prioritize different types of requests, which is bound to be a difficult task.
Finally, when communities of interest are split up between various districts,
constituents might have difficulty determining whom they should call with
casework requests.3
Some might argue that a non-culturally compact district is superior from a
constituent service perspective because its representative must take into
account a broader cross-section of interests within the minority community.
This argument has some force, but it suffers from two defects. First, in
actuality a representative is unlikely to take a broad cross-section of interests
135. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
136. See W. Mark Crain, Districts, Diversity, and Fiscal Biases: Evidence from the American States, 42
J.L. & EcoN. 675, 687-91 (1999) (finding some empirical support for the proposition that
intra-district homogeneity leads to delivery of more money through the appropriations
process); supra note 59 and accompanying text; cf Mark S. Hurwitz et al., Distributive and
Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the Jo4th House, 95 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 911, 917-18
(2001) (observing that members of House committees responsible for distributing
agriculture appropriations overwhelmingly come from districts dominated by agricultural
interests).
137. E.g., RIcHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESS AT THE GRASSROOTS: REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE
IN THE SOUTH, 1970-1998, at 94-95 (2000) (noting that Congressman Mac Collins
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into account. Given no easy way to prioritize various interests, representatives
are likely to favor the interests of the constituents who share their background
at the expense of others.' After all, remaining accessible to one's strongest
supporters is easier-calling up friends takes less time and effort than
attending constituency town halls. Additionally, a representative -particularly
a reasonably safe, senior representative from a minority-majority district- is
likely to derive more electoral benefits from remaining accessible to her
strongest supporters.' And, insofar as the interests of those supporters differ
from those of many other constituents, she is likely to ignore vital district
interests. The second problem is that a good faith effort to represent a broad
cross-section of minority interests is likely to provide a lower average level of
constituent service to each minority constituent. The choice here is between
effective representation of common interests shared by a large number of
minority residents and diluted representation of multiple different interests.
Thus, Texas likely selected a district in which constituents would receive a
lower quality of constituent services than they would have received in an
alternative district. Assuming plaintiffs were able successfully to make out their
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, Texas would then have
had to justify its choice according to neutral principles. Texas's primary
motivation for its selection of District 25-partisan advantage - would not have
constituted a valid neutral principle. Assuming Texas proved unable to provide
evidence supporting an alternative motivation, it would have been proper for a
court to require Texas to abandon District 25 in favor of District 23.
3. Shaw and District Shape
The dispute in Shaw began when the Attorney General denied section 5
preclearance for North Carolina's initial reapportionment map:
The Attorney General specifically objected to the configuration of
boundary lines drawn in the south-central to southeastern region of the
State. In the Attorney General's view, the General Assembly could have
created a second majority-minority district "to give effect to black and
Native American voting strength in this area" by using boundary lines
138. See FENNO, supra note 5, at 8-26, 172-73 (distinguishing a representative's "reelection
constituency" - made up of all supporters -from his "primary constituency" - made up of
his "strongest supporters" -and suggesting that representatives from safe seats tend to
focus attention on the needs of their "primary constituencies").
139. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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"no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan,"
but failed to do so for "pretextual reasons."1 4o
Instead of drawing the district described by the Attorney General or
challenging the Attorney General's conclusions in court, North Carolina
enacted a new reapportionment scheme that:
[L]ocated [a] second district not in the south-central to southeastern
part of the State, but in the north-central region along Interstate 85....
It is approximately 16o miles long and, for much of its length, no wider
than the 1-85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco
country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas "until it gobbles in
enough enclaves of black neighborhoods." Northbound and
southbound drivers on I-85 sometimes find themselves in separate
districts in one county, only to "trade" districts when they enter the
next county. Of the io counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are
cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. At one point the
district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point
with two other districts before crossing over them.'4
In evaluating the validity of this new map, the Supreme Court held that district
maps that "purposefully distinguish[] between voters on the basis of race"
must withstand strict scrutiny to comply with the Equal Protection Clause.14 2
Ever since, scholars have struggled to determine the harms that give rise to so-
called "Shaw claims,"'4 3 and, thus, who should have standing to bring such
claims.'"
140. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Brief
for Federal Appellees at 10a-lia, Shaw, 509 U.S. 630 (No. 92-357)). Shelby County does not
diminish the force of this example. See supra note 126.
141. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635-36 (citation omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 8o8 F. Supp. 461, 476-77
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
142. Id. at 646; see also id. at 649 ("[W]e conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment
statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation,
though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation
lacks sufficient justification.").
143. Justice White, writing in dissent in Shaw, noted: "Appellants have not presented a
cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury." Id. at 659 (White, J.,
dissenting). Scholars have frequently bemoaned the "legal incoherence and political chaos"
of the Supreme Court's Shaw claim jurisprudence. See Richard H. Pildes, Principled
Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, io6 YALE L.J. 2505, 2505 (1997); see also Guy-
Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the New
Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 227, 232 (2001)
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Rather than enter into that debate, I argue that, under my approach, the
Court could have reached the same result by focusing on constituent service
injuries. Like Texas in LULAC, North Carolina selected one minority-majority
district over another even though constituents in the rejected district would
likely have received a higher quality of constituent services. As an initial matter,
if, as seems likely, the redrawn district grouped together many different
members of a minority group from different parts of the state and different
socioeconomic classes, it might have presented the same "cultural
compactness" issues plaguing the district at issue in LULAC."' But the bizarre
shape of the redrawn district also created distinct barriers to effective delivery
of constituent services.
For one thing, the snakelike design of the district - and particularly the fact
that the district is often as narrow as a highway-might have left many
residents unsure of the identity of their representative.14'6 Not only would many
residents likely have lived on or near a district boundary line, but the district
would also have lacked contiguity with any meaningful political community
with which residents might have affiliated. Constituents who do not know the
identities of their representatives likely make fewer casework requests and
misdirect more requests. As a result, even a diligent representative from the
redrawn district might have struggled to carry out casework responsibilities.
But the district's odd design also could have reduced incentives for casework
diligence: a reason that representatives focus on casework responsibilities is to
create reputations for being "diligent servants of their constituents." The
"indirect contacts" that give rise to such reputations - one constituent telling
another about a positive experience -are less likely to occur when next-door
neighbors live in different districts.'
The snakelike design of the redrawn district would also have inhibited
accessibility and effective appropriating. On the accessibility side, the district's
(agreeing with Pildes's view). Perhaps the most persuasive understanding of Shaw is that it
addresses "expressive harms." See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 501-03, 507-o8 (1993).
144. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights
Law, iII HARv. L. REV. 2276,2285-88 (1998).
145. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
146. Unfortunately, no political scientists seem to have studied the relationship between
casework, district compactness, and representative name recognition, so this discussion is to
some degree conjectural.
147. Rivers & Fiorina, supra note 94, at 20.
148. Id. at 19.
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narrowness would have caused much of the territory inside a ten- or twenty-
mile radius from the site of a public event to fall outside the district. As a result,
constituents on average would have had to travel longer distances to attend
public events in the redrawn district than in the proposed district. To maintain
the same level of accessibility and develop the same level of constituent trust,
therefore, a representative would probably have needed to hold more public
events in the redrawn district than in the proposed district.149 Moreover, as a
result of its narrowness, the redrawn district would have consistently divided
political and geographic communities, such as towns, cities, counties, and
regions, as well as communities of interest. A senior center in a community
split between a snakelike district and other districts benefits fewer residents of
any single district than a similar center entirely contained within one district. A
representative has a greater electoral incentive to appropriate funds for a
project when that project is designed to benefit a greater number of that
representative's constituents."so
Thus, as in LULAC, the state chose to draw a minority-majority district in
which constituents were likely to receive a lower quality of services than
constituents would have received in an alternative district. Under my approach,
assuming plaintiffs successfully made out this prima facie case by a
preponderance of the evidence, North Carolina would have had to articulate a
neutral justification for its selection. As with Texas, North Carolina's
predominant motivation was pursuit of partisan advantage. Thus, unless
North Carolina provided evidence demonstrating an alternative valid
motivation, it would have been proper for a court to invalidate this aspect of
North Carolina's map.-
In this Section, I have attempted to outline how Congress and courts might
expand the tools in the racial reapportionment arsenal to protect the
constituent service interests of minority groups. While I have laid out the
broad parameters of one proposal, many questions still remain. For instance,
149. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
151. An advantage of this approach is that it avoids relying on the Shaw theory that a jurisdiction
may not rely too heavily on race even when engaging in the permissible but inherently
racially motivated process of designing minority-majority districts. See supra notes 141-144
and accompanying text. Identifying how much reliance on race is too much requires that
courts strike a delicate balance between permissible and impermissible race conscious
districting. Cf Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 9oo, 915-16 (1995) ("The courts, in assessing the
sufficiency of a challenge to a districting plan, must be sensitive to the complex interplay of
forces that enter a legislature's redistricting calculus. Redistricting legislatures will, for
example, almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race
predominates in the redistricting process.").
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what level of likely difference in constituent service quality would be significant
enough to require a jurisdiction to justify its selection of one district over the
other? Who would have Article III standing to bring a claim challenging a
jurisdiction's selection of one minority-majority district over another on this
basis?" What would happen if a defendant jurisdiction could show that better
protecting the constituent service interests of minority residents would come at
the cost of degrading the quality of constituent service that white residents
would receive, or the overall quality of constituent service across all districts?
These issues, as well as others, would need to be worked out. My goal has been
to demonstrate that a constituent service claim along the lines of what I
propose - or a different proposal with a similar purpose - is necessary to more
fully protect the political rights of minorities.
CONCLUSION
One purpose of this Note has been to bring election law up to date with the
political science literature addressing constituent service. My typology of
constituent service activities is meant to show election law scholars that,
contrary to a commonly held view, constituent service considerations can be
incorporated into legal analysis. A second purpose has been to argue that
election law scholars and judges should take constituent service seriously. I
have attempted to illustrate the significant representational benefits that a high
quality of constituent service can provide. Moreover, I have attempted to show
how current debates focusing on political competition and minority-majority
districting might benefit from a richer consideration of constituent service
implications. As long as scholars and judges are "enter[ing] [the] political
thicket" at all,' 3 they should keep in mind that policymaking is far from the
only aspect of representation that matters.
152. It might be that any constituent in the challenged district would have standing. It might be
that only minority constituents in the challenged district would have standing. It might be
that only constituents who lived in both the challenged district and the alternative district
would have standing, as only these constituents would have suffered redressable injuries. If
courts take this last approach, it is unclear whether any plaintiffs would have had standing
in Shaw. Alternatively, it might be that an organization such as LUIAC could assert
associational standing on behalf of its members, some of whom live in the challenged
district and some of whom live in the alternative district.
153. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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